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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

RAYMOND DEAN MCARTHUR,

CaseNo.20030380-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002), where the defendant in a district court criminal action may take
an appeal to the Court of Appeals from afinalorder for anything other than a first degree
or capital felony offense. In the underlying case related to this appeal, Appellant Raymond McArthur was convicted of two counts of threatening with or using a dangerous
weapon in afightor quarrel, class A misdemeanor offenses under Utah Code Ann. § 7610-506 (1999). A copy of the original judgment is attached hereto as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review are as follows: Whether the trial court failed to
comply with Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) in accepting defendant's guilty pleas, where the
court did not ascertain whether defendant read, understood, or acknowledged a written
statement that he was waiving his right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury; and
where the trial court failed to ascertain if defendant understood the nature and elements

of the offenses to which the pleas were entered. Also, whether the record in this case
fails to support a factual basis for both guilty pleas.
Standard of Review: This Court will review for correctness whether a trial court
has strictly complied with the constitutional and procedural requirements of accepting a
guilty plea. State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, ^14, 26 P.3d 203; see also State v. Smith. 812
P.2d 470,476 (Utah Ct. App. 19911 cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991) (a trial
court's failure to comply strictly with Utah R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting a guilty or no
contest plea is good cause, as a matter of law, for the withdrawal of that plea). In this
case, McArthur filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. The trial court denied that
motion. On appeal, McArthur is challenging the trial court's ruling on grounds that were
not raised below. Thus, McArthur is challenging the trial court's ruling here under the
plain-error doctrine. See State v. Dean. 2002 UT App 323,ffi[3& 9, 57 P.3d 1106, cert,
granted. 64 P.3d 586 (Utah 2003).
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
Although McArthur filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas in the trial court
(see Record ("R.") at 53-57, and 87), he is challenging the denial of that motion on
grounds that were not raised below. See Dean. 2002 UT App 323, %3. For that reason,
McArthur has raised the arguments on appeal in this case under the plain-error doctrine.
Under that doctrine, McArthur must show that ff(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should
have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." Dean. 2002 UT App
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323, p (quoting State v. Hittle. 2002 UT App 134,1J5, 47 P.3d 101).
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following provisions will be determinative of the issues on appeal: Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-10-506 (1999), 76-5-102 (Supp. 2003), and 76-5-103 (1999); and Utah R.
Crim. P. 11(e) (2003). The text of those provisions is contained in Addendum B, hereto.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings. Disposition in the Court Below.
On October 29, 2002, the state charged Raymond McArthur with two felony
offenses (aggravated assaults) and four misdemeanor offenses (assault, interference with
an officer making an arrest, domestic violence in the presence of a child, and intoxication). (R. 3-6.) After a preliminary hearing in the matter, on January 10, 2003, McArthur
entered a guilty plea for two counts of threatening with or using a dangerous weapon in a
fight or quarrel, class A misdemeanor offenses under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506
(1999). (R. 35-42.) The remaining charges were dismissed. (See R. 68.) On February
21, 2003, the trial judge entered judgment in the case. (R. 50-51; Addendum A, hereto.)
On March 21, 2003, McArthur filed a motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. (R. 5357.) On April 14, 2003, the trial court denied the motion. A copy of the trial court's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order is attached hereto as Addendum C.
(R. 67-69.) McArthur has timely appealed from the final order. (R. 70-71 (Notice of
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Appeal, dated April 30, 2003).)1
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The state charged McArthur with six crimes as a result of conduct allegedly occurring on October 26 and 27,2002. (R. 3-6.) McArthur pleaded guilty to two offenses. He
maintains on appeal that an insufficient factual basis exists for the pleas (see Argument).
At a preliminary hearing, state witnesses testified as follows. On October 26,
McArthur tended Sherile Fernandez's children, including 4-year-old Monica, during the
evening. Sherile is McArthur's daughter and Monica is his granddaughter. (See R. 5; 91:
5-6.) When Sherile returned home, she and Monica drove McArthur to 309 North 1000
West, where he lived with his mother Afton and his sister Laura Kendall. (R. 91:6-7.)
When Sherile and McArthur arrived at McArthur's house, he stated he wanted to
take Monica for the night; Sherile refused. (R. 91:7.) She noticed McArthur had been
drinking and did not want Monica to stay with him. (R. 91:7-8.) McArthur became
belligerent and rude. He and Sherile argued. (R. 91:8.) McArthur struck Sherile several

1 On May 12, 2003, McArthur filed a "Motion for Amended Sentence, Judgment,
Commitment." (R. 80-81.) The state stipulated to the motion and the trial court granted
it. (R. 82-83.) The motion was filed more than 2 months after the trial court executed the
original "Sentence, Judgment, Commitment." (SeeR. 50-51 (dated February 21, 2003).)
It had no effect on the time for filing the notice of appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 4(b)
(2003) (providing that the following, timely motions will toll the time for filing a notice
of appeal: a motion under Utah R. Civ. P. 50(b),filednot later than 10 days after
judgment; a motion under Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b),filednot later than 10 days after
judgment; a motion under Utah R. Civ, P. 59,filednot later than 10 days after judgment;
a motion under Utah R. Crim. P. 24,filedwithin 10 days of the imposition of sentence;
and a motion under statutory law to withdraw a guilty plea).
4

times on the right side of the face in front of Monica. (R. 5; 91:8.)
McArthur then stepped out of Sherile's car and got into the back of the car through
Monica's door. (R. 91:9.) When Sherile tried to stop McArthur, he threw her to the
ground. (R. 91:9.) At that point, Afton and Laura Kendall came outside the house (R.
91:9-10), and Sherile went inside to call 9-1-1. (R. 91:10.) Sherile stepped back outside
and McArthur hit her again on the side of the head with his fist (R. 91:10). McArthur
then ran away. Sherile did not see McArthur again. (R. 91:10-11.)
Laura Kendall testified that she saw McArthur hit Sherile. (R. 91:21-22.) When
police arrived, McArthur was not there. Police left, and Laura and Afton went inside the
house and locked the doors. (R. 91:22-23.) When McArthur returned to the house, Laura
and Afton refused to unlock the doors. (R. 91:23.) McArthur went to the basement and
kicked through a window and unlatched the door. (R. 91:23, 29.) McArthur then walked
into the kitchen and got a 10-inch knife to open an aspirin bottle. (R. 91:24.)
As McArthur struggled to get the bottle opened, he walked into the living room
with the knife. He told Laura and Afton he was going to shut off the lights. (R. 91:24.)
As McArthur said that, he raised his fist with the knife, but did not point it toward anyone
in particular. (R. 91:24-25; but see 91:31 (Laura believed McArthur pointed the knife
toward Afton when he turned off the lights, but was not sure).) McArthur turned off the
porch lights and television, and he sat in a chair. He did not say anything. He did not
threaten Afton or Laura. (R. 91:25.) He sat down and stood up repeatedly. (R. 91:25.)
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At some point, a police officer arrived at the house. As Laura and Afton walked
out the door, the officer walked in. (R. 91:26.)
Officer Evans testified that he walked into the living room, saw McArthur and
drew his weapon. (R. 91:35.) McArthur dropped the knife and Evans ordered McArthur
to the ground. McArthur asked the officer to shoot him. Evans testified that he "didn't
think that was a wise idea," so he sprayed pepper spray in McArthur's face. (R. 91:35.)
McArthur screamed in pain and rolled on the ground making it difficult for Evans to
handcuff him. (R. 91:36.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge bound McArthur
over on charges of aggravated assault (two counts), simple assault, committing domestic
violence in the presence of a child, and intoxication. (See R. 91:45.)
On January 10, 2003, McArthur entered guilty pleas for two counts of threatening
with or using a dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel, class A misdemeanor offenses
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 (1999). (R. 35-42.) The state dismissed the charges
for assaulting Sherile, for domestic violence infrontof Monica, and for intoxication.
(See R. 45-46; 68.)
On February 21, 2003, the trial court sentenced McArthur to consecutive one-year
terms at an adult correctional facility. (R. 50-51; 82-83.) On March 21,2003, McArthur
moved to withdraw the guilty pleas. (R. 53-57.) The trial court denied McArthur's
motion and this appeal followed. (R. 67-71.)
Additional facts relating to the arguments raised on appeal are set forth below.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The trial court failed to comply with Rule 11(e) in taking the guilty pleas in this
case. Rule 11(e) provides that the trial court may not accept a guilty plea unless it has
found that defendant knew of the right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury and that
defendant intended to waive that right. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3) (2003). In this case, the
trial court did not make that determination. Failure to comply with Rule 11(e) constitutes
plain and obvious error. See Dean, 2002 UTApp 323. McArthur respectfully asks this
Court to vacate the guilty pleas and to remand the case for further proceedings.
In addition, Rule 11(e) provides that before a trial court may accept a guilty plea, it
must find that defendant understood the nature and elements "of the offense to which the
plea is entered," and it must find "a factual basis" for the plea. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)
(A) & (B) (2003). The Utah Supreme Court has specified that those provisions require a
trial court to ensure that defendant understands the nature/elements of the offense in
relation to the facts. See State v Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1312-13 (Utah 1987). The
court will determine whether defendant pleaded guilty to facts "sufficient to support the
offense." State v. Thurman. 911 P.2d 371, 373 (Utah 1996). In this case, the facts of
record fail to support two separate counts of threatening with or using a dangerous
weapon in a fight or quarrel. Specifically, the record is insufficient for the second
conviction. Thus, under the plain-error analysis, the plea proceedings were improper.
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ARGUMENTS
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF RULE life) IN OBTAINING THE GUILTY
PLEAS.
Pursuant to Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court may not
accept a guilty plea from the defendant until the court "has found" that defendant has
voluntarily made the plea; the defendant knows of certain, specified, constitutional rights,
and he knows that by entering the guilty plea he is waiving those rights; the defendant
understands the nature and the elements of the offense to which the plea is entered; and
there is a factual basis for the plea. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) (2003). The trial court must
comply strictly with the requirements set forth in Rule 11(e) before accepting a guilty plea
from the defendant. See State v. Corwell 2003 UT App 261, ^[12, 478 Utah Adv. Rep. 5,
petition for cert filed (August 18, 2003) (citing Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312; State v.
Abeyta. 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993); Dean. 2002 UT App 323, ^[10 n.2; State v.
Visser, 2000 UT 88,ffl[10-l1, 22 P.3d 1242; and Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)).
In order to comport with Rule 11(e) requirements, the trial court may engage in a
plea colloquy with the defendant on the record, and/or use a "written statement reciting
[the factors set forth in Rule 11(e)] after the court has established that the defendant has
read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement." Utah R. Crim. P.
11(e)(8); State v. Mills. 898 P.2d 819, 823 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (noting that to
properly incorporate an affidavit, the trial judge must ascertain that defendant has read,
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understood, and acknowledged all the information contained therein). In this case,
although McArthur signed a statement, the trial court did not incorporate it into the
colloquy for the plea as required by the rule.2 Thus, the statement is irrelevant as further
explained below. See infra, subpart A., herein.
In addition, in proceeding with the colloquy on the record, the trial court failed to
advise McArthur of the right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury; the court failed to
ascertain that it was McArthur's choice to waive that right; and the court failed to determine whether McArthur had any understanding of the elements to which he entered the
guilty pleas and their relationship to the facts in this case. Those matters are further
discussed below. See infra, subparts B., and C, herein.
A. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY INCORPORATE THE
STATEMENT INTO THE PLEA COLLOQUY.
Utah law allows a trial judge to rely on a "written statement" or affidavit in fulfilling the requirements set forth at Rule 11(e). See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(8) (2003).
However, before the trial court may look to the "written statement," the court must establish "that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement." Id. The language of Rule 11(e)(8) serves to ensure that the trial court is taking a

2 The record from the plea proceedings does not indicate whether McArthur read the
statement before signing it. According to the record, McArthur appeared in open court
and answered questions from the judge about certain constitutional rights. (R. 92:5-7.)
After the judge engaged in a partial colloquy, the judge then instructed McArthur to sign
the statement, which he did. (R. 92:7.)
9

knowing and voluntary plea. That is, before a defendant is asked to waive important
constitutional rights associated with entering a guilty plea, the court must establish that
defendant is waiving those rights by his choosing.
"What is at stake for an accused facing [punishment] demands the utmost
solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make
sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence."
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312 (cite omitted); see i d at 1313-1314 (identifying the
information that the affidavit should contain, and specifying that the "trial judge should
then review the statements in the affidavit with the defendant, question the defendant
concerning his understanding of it, and fulfill the other requirements imposed by § 77-3511 [superceded by Rule 11(e)] on the record before accepting the guilty plea").
In this case, the record contains a plea statement setting forth information required
by Rule 11(e) and Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313-1314.3 A copy of the statement is attached
hereto as Addendum D. The statement asserts that McArthur was advised of and

3 Under Gibbons, an affidavit or written statement should contain the information
required by Rule 11(e). Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313. Such an affidavit serves as a starting
place for the colloquy. Id, To ensure the trial judge has made "the constitutionally
required determination that the defendant's plea is truly knowing and voluntary," id at
1314, the judge is required under the constitutional standard in Gibbons to "review the
statements in the affidavit with the defendant, question the defendant concerning his
understanding of it, and fulfill the other requirements" imposed by Rule 11(e) before
accepting the plea. I d If the trial court were to rely only on the affidavit to fulfill the rule
requirements, that would be improper; it would amount to a plea from defendant's lawyer.
Under Gibbons and U.S. Supreme Court precedent, such a plea would be unconstitutional. See id at 1313 (citing Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 650 (1976)).
10

understood that he was pleading to two counts of threatening with or using a dangerous
weapon in a fight or quarrel. (R. 35.) It identified the degree of the offenses, and the
maximum punishments. (Id.)
The statement included a "waiver of constitutional rights/' and identified the right
"to a speedy and public trial by an impartial (unbiased) jury/' the right to confront/crossexamine witnesses, the right to compel witnesses, the right to testify and the privilege
against self-incrimination, the presumption of innocence and the state's burden of proof,
and the right to appeal. (R. 36-38.) The statement specified the potential penalties and
relevant plea bargains, and that McArthur was entering the pleas freely, voluntarily,
knowingly, and without coercion, threats, or unlawful influence. (R. 38-39.)
The record in this case supports that the trial court opted not to use the written
statement/affidavit as a basis for fulfilling the requirements set forth at Rule 11(e). Specifically, at the plea hearing the trial court did not ascertain or "establish[]" whether
defendant had "read, understood and acknowledged the contents of the statement." See
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(8). A copy of the transcript for the plea hearing is attached hereto
as Addendum E. Rather, the court simply asked both defense counsel and defendant
whether they had "gone over" the statement, and whether McArthur understood it or had
questions about it. (R. 92:3-6.) That is insufficient. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(8).
"When an affidavit is used to evidence defendant's knowledge and willingness to
plead guilty, the trial court's examination of defendant regarding the affidavit's contents
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should be sufficiently detailed and extensive to provide a factual basis to conclude from
defendant's responses that his decision was knowing and voluntary." State v. Valencia.
776 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis added).
Stated another way, if the trial judge had intended to rely on the statement to fulfill
any part of the Rule 11(e) colloquy, the trial judge should have taken measures to ascertain on the record what was set forth in the statement, what defendant reviewed with his
attorney, and the extent to which defendant comprehended and acknowledged those
provisions of the statement that he reviewed. While such a procedure would have taken
additional time, that is inconsequential. "[Constitutional rights may not be sacrificed in
the name of judicial economy." Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1314. On this record, the judge did
not examine Mc Arthur about the rights contained in the statement. (See R. 92.) The judge
did not engage in a detailed, extensive examination of the statement to ensure that it constituted a knowing, voluntary guilty plea to the offenses. See Valencia, 776 P.2d at 1335.
Thus, in determining whether the trial court complied with Rule 11(e) in this case,
the statement is irrelevant. See State v. Ostler. 2000 UT App 28, ^{20, 996 P.2d 1065
(although the video tape generally discussed the constitutional and other requirements set
forth in Rule 11(e), the trial court failed to make any effort to determine defendant's
particular understanding of the tape, rendering the tape useless "even as a preliminary
foundation for Rule 11(e) compliance"), affd. 2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 528; Valencia. 776
P.2d at 1335; also Martinez. 2001 UT 12, %5 (trial court questioned defendant about
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affidavit; defendant "understood the terms and conditions of the affidavit and plea
agreement"; he also "acknowledged to the court that he read and discussed the affidavit
with counsel and he still wished to enter into the plea agreement").
The record in this case supports that the trial judge intended to accept the guilty
pleas based only on the court's questioning of the defendant on the record. See Utah R.
Crim. P. 11(e)(8); see also Addendum E, hereto. Thus, this Court should look only to
the colloquy to determine whether the trial court met the requirements of Rule 11(e).
Under that analysis, the trial court did not comply with the rule, as further explained.
B. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER MCARTHUR
INTENDED TO KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO
A SPEEDY TRIAL BEFORE AN IMPARTIAL JURY.
Here, the trial court engaged in only a partial Rule 11(e) colloquy. During the
questioning of the defendant on the record, the court did not ascertain (among other
things) whether McArthur knowingly and voluntarily intended to waive his right to a
speedy trial before an impartial jury. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3); (see R. 92). On that
basis, the plea is insufficient. The record contains a plain and obvious error under the law.
To explain, in State v. Dean, 2002 UT App 323, defendant pleaded guilty to a
felony count of child abuse and two misdemeanor offenses. Id at fl. Prior to sentencing,
he moved to withdraw the pleas and the trial court denied the motion. Id at %2. Dean
appealed and argued for the first time that the trial court committed plain error because it
failed to advise him of his right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury. Id at ^[3. This
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Court agreed. It ruled that the trial court's failure to advise Dean of those rights, "dealt
with a substantial constitutional right." Id. at ^[12 (cite omitted). This Court presumed
harm as a result of the omission in the colloquy and reversed the trial court's ruling on the
motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. Id, cert granted. 64 P.3d 586 (Utah 2003). This
Court issued its ruling in Dean three months before the trial court engaged in the plea
colloquy with McArthur.
Next, this Court's ruling in State v. Corwell 2003 UT App 261, is consistent with
Dean. There, the defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of attempted evidence tampering.
Id. at ^fl. In connection with the plea colloquy, the trial court advised Corwell that by
pleading guilty, she was giving up her right to a trial before an impartial jury "and that her
trial was scheduled for the following Monday." IcL at ^[7. The judge did not use the word
"speedy" in the colloquy, and the plea statement did not contain that word. Id.
When Corwell later moved to withdraw the guilty plea, the trial court denied the
motion. Corwell appealed. See icl atffl|8-9.She argued that the "trial court failed to
strictly comply with rule 1 lfs requirements that she be informed of her right to a speedy
trial and that her guilty plea would limit her right to appeal." Id. at ^ 11 (cite omitted).
In considering the matter in Corwell, this Court looked to the circumstances of the
case to determine whether the defendant had been apprised of her speedy trial right. Id. at
1J15. It recognized that trial was set for the following Monday. That fact did not relieve
the trial court of advising defendant that she was waiving her right to a speedy trial.
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"Modern trial practice is replete with opportunities for delay, postponement, or
continuance. Without more, the mere mention of an imminent trial date is not sufficient
to satisfy rule 1 lfs requirement that a defendant be apprised of the right to a speedy trial."
IdL at ^[15. This Court found the trial court's colloquy to be incomplete.
Also, it reiterated the following: "'It is not sufficient to assume that defense
attorneys make sure that their clients fully understand the contents of the affidavit.'
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313. The duty to ensure that defendants know and understand the
rights they are surrendering when pleading guilty rests not on the parties, but on the trial
court. See id at 1312." CorwelL 2003 UT 261, ^[18: see State v. TarnawieckL 2000 UT
App 186, TJ18, 5 P.3d 1222 (the trial court's failure to advise the defendant of her
constitutional right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury constituted obvious error).
The Plain and Obvious Error Here. In McArthur's case, the trial court committed
plain and obvious error when it failed to ascertain during the plea colloquy whether
McArthur intended to waive his right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury. See
Dean, 2002 UT App 323.
First, under established law, the trial court was required to comply strictly with
Rule 11(e). See Corwell 2003 UT 261, ^[18 (rule 11 compliance is not the province of
defense counsel). While compliance may be accomplished by multiple means, Utah
courts have expressed a preference for a colloquy on the record, see Gibbons, 740 P.2d at
1313-14, and the courts have placed limits on the use of a statement. Id Specifically, a
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trial court may rely on a written statement to fulfill the requirements of Rule 11(e) if the
court has established "that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the
contents of the statement." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(8). "[W]hen plea affidavits are properly incorporated in the record (as when the trial judge ascertains in the plea colloquy
that the defendant has read, has understood, and acknowledges all the information contained therein), they may properly form a part of the basis for finding rule 11 compliance." Mills, 898 P.2d at 823 n. 4 (quoting State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1991)).
Stated another way, if the trial court intends to rely on a written statement to fulfill
Rule 11(e) requirements, it must engage in a sufficiently detailed and extensive examination of the rights contained in the statement to ensure the guilty plea is a knowing and
voluntary decision of the defendant. See Valencia, 776 P.2d at 1335; Gibbons, 740 P.2d
at 1313. The trial court must ensure on the record that defendant is properly informed of
his rights and that he has chosen to waive those rights. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1314.
Here, although the written statement identified defendant's "right to a speedy and
public trial by an impartial (unbiased) jury" and a waiver thereof (R. 37), the trial judge
did not discuss those rights with McArthur to ensure that he understood them and
intended to waive them. The court did not engage in a detailed or extensive examination
of the statement or the rights contained in the statement. (See R. 92, generally); see also
supra, subpart A., herein; Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312-13; Valencia, 776 P.2d at 1335.
Instead, during a colloquy on the record, the trial judge asked whether defense
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counsel had "gone over" the statement with McA *

- ' 2 : 3 . ) Both McArthur and his

counsel answered in the affirmative. (R. 92:3-6.) McArthur also stated that he
understood the statement and he had no questions. (R. 92:5-6.) Thereafter, the trial court
informed McArthur that he was waiving certain constitutional rights:
Including the right to [be] tried by a jury of eight people, the right to require the
State to prove their case against you beyond a reasonable doubt to the unanimous
satisfaction of a jury of eight people, the right to confront and cross examine
witnesses produced by the State against you, the right to compel the attendance of
witnesses in your own behalf at no cost to you, the right to take the stand and
testify in your own behalf, if you choose, or remain silent during the trial, if you
choose, and the right to appeal in the event a jury finds you guilty of the charges at
a trial, as well as the right to be presumed innocent until you're found guilty if you
are, all of which rights, as well as the others contained on that statement that we
may not have discussed you're waiving by the entry of a guilty plea. Do you
understand that?
(R. 92:6-7.) McArthur answered "Yes, sir, I do." (R. 92:7.) McArthur then signed the
written statement and counsel provided it to the trial judge. (Id.; see supra, note 2, herein.)
The trial judge in this matter did not advise McArthur during the colloquy of his
right to a "speedy" trial before an impartial jury. (R. 92.) Rule 11(e) requires a judge to
inform a defendant of that right, and to ascertain that by his plea defendant intends to
waive that right. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e); Dean. 2002 UT App 323; CorwelL 2003 U r
261. Whi 1c R iik I Uv) docs n<»( require "a particular script or rote recitation of the rights
listed" therein (CorwelL 2003 UT App 261, ^f 13 (cite omitted)), the trial court must make
certain that "no requirement of the rule is omitted" in taking a plea: the defendant must be
informed of the speedy trial right before an impartial jury, Id, 1 he court's failure here to
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advise McArthur of that right is obvious error. Dean, 2002 UT App 323, «J12.
Also, for the reasons stated above (supra, subpart A., herein), the written statement
here does not support compliance with Rule 11(e); the judge did not "properly
incorporate[]" the statement into the plea proceedings. See Mills, 898 P.2d at 823 n.4.
The trial judge did not examine McArthur about constitutional rights identified in the
statement; the judge did not ascertain which parts of the statement McArthur read or the
level of his understanding; and the judge did not ask McArthur to acknowledge any rights
contained in the statement. (See R. 92); Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(8).
Where the trial court made no "effort to determine the circumstances under which
[this] particular defendant" reviewed the statement "or his or her level of understanding
thereof," Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, ^[20, the record concerning the statement "fails to
satisfy the trial court's responsibility of ensuring on the record that a defendant's guilty
plea is knowing and voluntary in accordance with the requirements of Rule 11(e)," and it
renders the statement "virtually useless even as a preliminary foundation for Rule 11(e)
compliance." Id.; see Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1314; also supra, note 3, herein.
In this case, the record of the plea proceedings fails to support that McArthur had
notice of his constitutional right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury and that he
knowingly waived that right. The trial court committed plain/obvious error in failing to
comply with Rule 11(e) in the plea proceedings. See Dean, 2002 UT App 323,1fl|10-12.
The Prejudice Here. Next, the trial court's error was harmful. This Court ruled in
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Dean and Corwell that failure to strictly comply with Rule 11(e) in advising defendant of
his right to a speed) trial before an impartial jury constituted prejudicial error.
Finally, the trial court's omission was harmful because the omission dealt
with a substantial constitutional right. It is well established under Utah law
that we will presume harm under plain error analysis when a trial court fails
to inform a defendant of his constitutional rights under rule 11. See, e.g.,
TarnawieckU 5 P.3d 1222, 2000 UT App 186 at ^[18 (presuming harm
when trial court failed to inform Defendant that she was entitled to a
"speedy trial before an impartial jury"); State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28,
^[25-26, 996 P.2d 1065 (presuming harm where trial court failed to inform
defendant that he would waive certain constitutional rights by pleading
guilty)
Hittle, 2002 UT App 134 at ^[9,47 P.3d 101 (first citation omitted). Accordingly,
the trial court committed plain error by failing to advise Dean of his right to a
speedy trial before an impartial jury.
Dean. 2002 UT App 323, f 12 (note omitted); see. also Corwell. 2003 UT App 261, TJ19;
Ostler. 2000 UT App 28, ^25 (where the court failed to advise defendant, among other
things, of his constitutional rights and that he was waiving those rights, defendant was
not fully informed at the time of the plea, rendering the plea in v oh mtary).
Under the plain-error analysis, McArthur respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas.
C. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO
EXPLAIN THE LEGAL ELEMENTS IN RELATION TO THE FACTS FOR
THE GUILTY PLEAS AND WHEN IT FAILED TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER
MCARTHUR UNDERSTOOD THE RELATIONSHIP. THE COURT ALSO
COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO ASCERTAIN A
FACTUAL BASIS FOR EACH GUILTY PLEA.
1. The Trial Court Did Not Discuss the Elements of Both Offenses in Relation to
the Facts of the Case: Instead, the Court Relied on One Set of Facts to Support a
Guilty Plea for Both Counts. That Was Improper.
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The Utah Supreme Court has specified that to make a knowing guilty plea, the
defendant must "understand the elements of the crimes charged and the relationship of the
law to the facts." Gibbons. 740 P.2d at 1312. "This is the requirement of Rule 11(e)(4)."
Mills. 898 P.2d at 824; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4) (2003).
A defendant's "understanding of the elements of the charges and the relationship
of the law and the facts may not be presumed from a silent or incomplete examination."
Valencia. 776 P.2d at 1335. "[T]he factual elements of the charges against the defendant
must be explained in the taking of a guilty plea so that the defendant understands and
admits those elements: [4]Because a guilty plea is an admission of all of the elements of a
formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an
understanding of the law in relation to the facts.[']" Gibbons. 740 P.2d at 1313 (citing
McCarthy v. U.S.. 394 U.S. 459 (1969)).
In Martinez. 2001 UT 12, the prosecutor articulated facts on the record supporting
a plea for murder, where defendant shook 3-year-old Orlando Chacon, and the child died
of the injuries. Id. at <[fl|2, 4. The defendant acknowledged that he committed an act endangering the child's life, he intended to cause serious bodily injury, he violently shook
the child intentionally/knowingly, and he caused the child's death. Id at ^[6. Based on
the record, the supreme court ruled that the plea proceedings were sufficient. Id at ^|25.
In State v. Thurman. 911 P.2d 371 (Utah 1996), defendant pleaded guilty to
aggravated murder in exchange for the state's promise to not seek the death penalty and to
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dismiss other charges against him. Id. at 372. Thurman later moved to withdraw I he
guilty plea, and the trial court denied the motion. Id. On ... • i v.; •. the Utah Supreme Court
considered "the elements of the offense for which Thurman was charged, aggravated
murder by means of a bomb," and "whether the record demonstrate^] that Thurman
understood these elements and knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty to facts
sufficient to support the offense." Id. at 373.
The court recognized that in the plea affidavit, Thurman acknowledged the
elements of aggravated murder, where the actor "intentionally or knowingly causes the
death of another by means of a bomb hidden or concealed in a place and he | sit | his iit (
would create a great risk of tliMilli

- - . uie. id. a u /**.

With respect to whether Thurman pleaded guilty to facts sufficient to support the
offense, the court considered the following:
Thurman stated his conduct which he believed constituted the elements of
aggravated murder by means of a bomb:
Prior to May 15, 1991, in Salt Lake County, Utah, I placed a bomb I had
constructed in Howard Cook!s Landcruiser. It was not my intention to kill Adam
Cook. However, I knew the bomb could cause death and I knew that by
concealing it I had created a great risk of death to anyone in that vehicle.
Thurman, 911 P.2d at 374. I he court also recognized that during examination on the
record Thin mail maintained that he did not intend to kill Adam Cook, but that he knew
the bomb could cause death. IcL at 374-75. And the court found it relevant that the
parties and the trial judge were generally confused concerning the proper mental state for
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the offense. Id. at 375.
Based on that record, the supreme court ruled that "Thurman failed to admit facts
sufficient to support an aggravated murder conviction and that the record, as a whole,
fail[ed] to demonstrate that Thurman fully comprehended the nature and elements of the
offense to which he pleaded guilty." Id. at 375; id n.4 (the court refused to make
inferences about the plea; it focused only on the "facts Thurman admitted" in plea
proceedings, "as opposed to the facts he failed to deny").
In State v. Breckenridge. 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983), the defendant was charged
with aggravated arson and he pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of arson. Id_ at 441-42.
During the plea colloquy, the trial court identified the elements for arson and asked the
defendant whether he understood the elements and whether he understood that he was
pleading guilty to the elements. The defendant answered yes. Thereafter, the defendant
related the facts purportedly supporting the crime. Id. at 442. The defendant explained
that while at work, he decided to bum old car and service parts to get rid of them. After
defendant started the fire, he could not get it out and it burned the building roof. Based
on that description of the facts, the trial court accepted the guilty plea. Id.
Thereafter, at sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. Id_ He
again described the fire as accidental and argued that he was improperly influenced to
plead guilty by stories of sexual and physical abuse in prison. Id. Defendant also argued
that "the prosecutor misrepresented to him the existence of an eyewitness, and that the
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prosecutor failed to expose exculpatory evidence." Id. (note omitted). I he trial court
denied the motion, and defendant appealed. Id. at 442-43. ] during oral argument in 1:1 le
supreme court, the defendant "addressed for the first time the argument that his right to
due process was violated because his guilty plea was accepted by the court without his
understanding the nature and elements of arson and without any showing that there was
any factual basis upoi i vvl lich to base a coi i\ iction of the ci ime "" I d . at 443.
Due to the importance of the issue at stake, the supreme court addressed
defendant's newly raised argument. The supreme court found that the trial court failed to
comply with Rule 11(e).
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4) specifically states that "the court.... shall not accept.... a
plea [of guilty] until the court has made the findings:.... (4) That the defendant
understands the nature and elements of the offense to which he is entering the
plea." N o such finding was explicitly made in this case, and indeed could not have
been correctly made based on the defendant's statements to the prosecutor and the
court at the time the plea was entered.
Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 443. The record failed to recite a "factual basis from which
we might c •oncli ide that arson ever occurred "'"" Id.

• •

The court specified that the trial court "'has an undoubted duty to guard against
the possibility that an accused who is innocent of the crime charged may be induced to
plead guilty without sufficient understanding of the nat uiv of the charge in (lie
consequences of his plea ....'" Id_ at 443 (cite omitted). It noted that trial courts must
protect against situations where the defendant has misunderstood the nature of the crime
against him. "'A person may well know what he has done but not be sufficiently skilled
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in law to recognize that his acts do not constitute the offense with which he is charged/,f
Id. at 443 n.2 (cite omitted). For example, a defendant should not be allowed to plead
guilty to "mailing obscene material until the court has examined the material to determine
that it is in fact obscene." Id (cite omitted); see also Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, Tf 14
(ruling that the trial court failed to explain the nature and elements of the offense and to
find a factual basis for the plea). The supreme court vacated Breckenridge's guilty plea.
The Plain and Obvious Error Here. In this case, McArthur pleaded guilty to two
counts of "threatening with or using [a] dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel." The
statute identifies the elements for that offense as follows:
Every person, except those persons described in Section 76-10-503, who, not in
necessary self defense in the presence of two or more persons, draws or exhibits
any dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening manner or unlawfully uses the
same in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 (1999).
Utah courts have ruled that this offense may be established with proof that defendant pointed "a gun (a dangerous or deadly weapon)" at two officers in an angry and
threatening way. State v. Oldrovd. 685 P.2d 551, 553, 554 (Utah 1984). However, if
defendant was not involved in a fight or quarrel when he exhibited the dangerous weapon,
the provision may not apply. See State v. Parra. 972 P.2d 924, 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Where McArthur pleaded guilty to two counts of the offense, the trial court was
required to ascertain whether McArthur understood the nature and elements of both
charges in relation to the facts of the case. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312-13; Utah R. Crim.
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P. 11(e)(4)(A). In this case, the trial court accepted the guilty pleas on both counts
without making that assessment. That is, McA i thui failed to admit facts sufficien '
support two convictions. In that regard, the plea proceedings were plainly defective. See
Thurman. 911 P.2d at 375; Breckenridge. 688 P.2d at 443-44; Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4).
Consider the record here. The written statement contained the following: "The
elements of the crime(s) to which 1 am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: Every person
who, not in necessary self defense in the presence of two or more persons, draws or
exhibits any dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening manner or unlawfully uses the
same in any fight or quarrel." (R. 36.) It also stated, "On October 26,2002, at 309 North
! 0(10 West., Salt I ,akc County, I twice exhibited a knife in a threatening manner in the
presence of two persons." (R. 36.) The description of the offenses was couched in terms
of the statutory language without setting forth the nature of each charge in relation to the
facts. See Thurman, 911 P.2d at 374 (recognizing that plea affidavit set forth the
elements; proceedings ne\ ertheless were inadequate).
On the record during the colloquy, the trial court described the offenses as follows:
THE COURT:... Mr. McArthur, you understand by having signed this statement
you are [admitting as] true and correct the following facts and elements involved
in two separate counts of threatening with or using a dangerous weapon in a fight
or quarrel, specifically that on or about the 26th of October [2002] through the 27th
of October [2002], at the location of 309 North 1000 West in Salt Lake County,
you, according to the offense, did not in self defense draw or exhibit a dangerous
weapon in an angry or threatening manner or unlawfully used the same in a fight
or quarrel. Those facts and elements are true and correct, are they not, sir?
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir.
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THE COURT: This same conduct, which is constituted as a threat of a dangerous use of a dangerous weapon in a fight occurred at the same location, 309 North,
1000 West during the same timeframe, the 26th/27th October on two different
occasions.
MS. REMAL: It was during one incident, your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, there's two different charges.
MS. REMAL: Right.
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes.
THE COURT: So someone has been able to find that there were two separate
incidences going on here, even though it may have been part of the same larger
fight, right? You're prepared to plead to two separate charges MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, there THE COURT: - involving the use of threatening use of a dangerous weapon.
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: Those facts and elements as they relate to the use of dangerous
weapons, specifically a knife, did occur during the time frame as indicated at the
location stated; is that right, sir?
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Do you understand that those facts and elements constitute two
separate class A misdemeanor crimes for which you could be sentenced by this
Court for a period of up to one year in the Adult Detention Center and fined a sum
of $2500 plus a surcharge. That's clear to you; is it not?
MR. MCARTHUR: Yes, sir.
(R. 92:7-9 (emphasis added.)) The trial court here failed to discuss the nature and the
elements of the two separate charges in relation to the facts of this case. (See R. 92.)
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Specifically, \\ here I he crime of "threatening with or using [a] dangerous weapon
in a fight or quarrel" requires the state to prove that defendant exhibited a dangerous
weapon "in the presence of two or more persons " Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506
(emphasis added), the trial judge in this case did not mention that necessary element
during the plea colloquy. (See R. 92); State v. Mason, 726 P.2d 772, 781 (Idaho 1986)
(considering a similar statute, the Idaho court stated that the crime "is not committed
unless the exhibition occurs i n the presence of two (2) or more persons.' Thus the
presence of two or more persons is an essential element of the crime"). Thus, the guilty
pleas cannot be know inp, nnd voluntary. See Thurman, 9 * **.2d at 374-75.
In addition, there was no discussion of the elemen

facts for each

separate offense. For example, for each separate count, how did McArthur purportedly
exhibit a dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening manner and/or in afight,and
who were the "two oi more persons" for each count? (See R. 92; 36 (stating only that on
October 26, 2002, at 309 North 1000 West, "I twice exhibited a knife in a threatening
manner in the presence of two persons").) Significantly, the prosecutor offered no theory
for the double charges under § 76-10-506, and no explanation of how the separate crimes
were accomplished or how the separate charges related I he facts of the case. (R. 92.)
Assuming arguendo the "two or more persons" here were Afton and I anni
McArthur's admissions and the record support only one offense, where McArthur had a
knife in his hand in the presence of Afton and Laura at one location during one specific
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"time frame." (R. 92:8 (in identifying the second count, the court referred to "the same
conduct" as the first count and the same "time frame").) See People v. HalL 83 Cal. App.
4th 1084, 1096, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 279, 288 (Cal. App. 2000) (considering the provisions
of a similar California statute, and ruling that the single act of exhibiting afirearmin the
presence of a peace officer "cannot be punished as many times as there are peace officers
observing the act"); Oldroyd, 685 P.2d at 553, 554 (ruling that officer's testimony that
defendant pointed a gun when two officers approached the stairwell supported an instruction on the crime of exhibiting a dangerous weapon); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1999).
Indeed, after the judge engaged in the limited discussion of the first charge with
McArthur, the judge used the same facts to discuss the second charge, asserting that the
"use of a dangerous weapon in afightoccurred" at the same location during the same
time frame, "on two different occasions." (R. 92:8.) That is insufficient to constitute two
separate offenses. The judge did not identify a factual basis for the second count; he
made no attempt to distinguish it in any way from the first count. (R. 92:8-9.)
At that point, counsel for McArthur informed the court that the facts described for
both counts occurred "during one incident, your Honor." (R. 92:8.) Counsel agreed there
were two charges, and the judge then stated that "someone has been able to find that there
were two separate incidences going on here, even though it may have been part of the
same larger fight, right?" (R. 92:8 (emphasis added).) Without waiting for an answer and
without exploring the nature of the two separate charges, the judge then asked McArthur
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to plead to the counts, which he did. (R, 92:8-9.)
Under established law, the "someone" responsible ioi ensuring that a separate
factual basis existed for each separate count was the judge. "The court has an undoubted
duty to guard against the possibility that an accused who is innocent of the crime charged
may be induced to plead guilty without sufficient understanding of the nature of the
charge or the consequences of his plea.'" Breckenridge. 688 P.2d at 443 (cite omitted).
Rather than inquire into the factual basis for and the nature of the two separate
charges, and rather than ascertain the relation of the separate offenses to the facts of the
case, Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312, the judge proceeded with the plea, K *•'. >-v ° hat
was improper. 1 his record supports that tl le ji idge accepted w< - ^ ftv pleas for ,* >•••-ngle
incident. Although McArthur affirmed that he was pleading to two separate counts (id.),
it is apparent from this record that he was not advised of and he misunderstood the legal
elements in relation to the facts. He was not "sufficiently skilled in [the] law to recognize •!

- • * (Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 443 n 2) did not suppor t tvs o convictions.
Also, since the trial court did not mention during the colloquy that one count of

exhibiting a dangerous weapon occurs in the presence of two or more persons (see R. 92),
McArthur did not have the opportunity to understand the lutim: ol lite elements in relation to this case or to explain to the judge how his conduct constituted only one crime.
See Hall 83 Cal. App. 4th at 1095-96, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 288 (finding a single act of exhibiting a firearm in the presence of more than one officer). Thus, the guilty pleas here
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were accepted by the trial court without defendant understanding the nature/elements of
the two separate charges in relation to the facts. That constitutes plain and obvious error.
See Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 443-44 (addressing issue raised for the first time on appeal
and finding error); Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312-13 (stating a plea cannot be voluntary
unless the defendant received "real notice of the true nature of the charge against him,
the first, and most universally recognized, requirement of due process"); Thurman, 911
P.2d at 374-75 (stating the court will determine whether the record supports a voluntary
plea with facts sufficient for the offense; where defendant failed to admit sufficient facts,
the plea was defective).
The Prejudice. Next, the error here was prejudicial. As the Utah Supreme Court
recognized in Breckenridge, Rule 11(e)(4) provides that a guilty plea may not be accepted
unless the court has found that defendant understood the nature and the elements of the
offense(s) to which he is entering a guilty plea. It stated,
No such finding was explicitly made in this case, and indeed could not have been
correctly made based on the defendant's statements to the prosecutor and the court
at the time the plea was entered.
On the basis of this record, we must conclude that Breckenridge did not
understand the nature and elements of the crime to which he pled guilty. First, the
record recites no factual basis from which we might conclude that an arson ever
occurred. U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-102 requires as an element of arson that a person
intentionally damage property. Neither in Breckenridgefs so-called "confession"
nor in his relation of events to the trial court can we find any facts that show he
intended to damage any property. The logical inference from what is in the record
is that it was his job to dispose of old parts and that he believed burning them
would be the easiest method. There would, therefore, have been no reason for
Breckenridge to plead guilty to arson when arson had not been committed unless
he mistakenly believed through a misapprehension of the nature and elements of
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the crime that he had committed it in being responsible, accidentally or
deliberately, for the burning of the parts. This inconsistency is amplified by the
trial judge's explanation to Breckenridge that he was being specifically charged
with "intentionally burning a building.ff This more specific charge makes even
more obvious the absence of any facts showing the crime. As already indicated,
the judge failed to make any finding on the record that Breckenridge understood
the nature and elements of arson, as required by Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4), and we
are convinced by the contents of the record that Breckenridge did not.
Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 443 (note omitted). The court ri ilecl that the conviction must be
vacated and the plea set aside. Id. at 444. The lessons of Breckenridge apply here.
While the trial court accepted McArthur's guilty pleas (R. 92:9), the court did not
make any finding with respect to the nature of the elements for each separate offense or
discuss their relationship to the facts here.4 Indeed, McArthur entered two guilt) pleas
for a single incident through some misapprehension of the facts and the elements. On
that basis the plea proceedings were fundamentally flawed.
Also, as this Court has stated, "a trial court's 'failure to inform a defendant of the
nature and elements of the offense is fatal to a guilty plea conviction " Ostler, 2000 I IT
App 28, T[25 (cite omitted). If McArthur had been informed of the nature/elements of the
separate offenses, and their relation to the facts of this case, he would not have pleaded
guilty to two charges, see Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, ^[26, particularly since his conduct
supported only one offense. (See.R. 92:8 (identifying but not explaining dial "|1 |his same

4 Although rule 11(e)(4)(A) required the judge in McArthur's case to find that defendant
understood the nature and elements of the offenses to which the pleas were entered, no
such finding was made. (See R. 92; 42; also 67-68); Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 444.
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conduct" at "the same location" "during the same time frame" for the "two different"
offenses)); infra, subpart C.2., pp. 35-40, herein; Hall, 83 Cal. App. 4th at 1096, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 288 (finding a single act). "Because '[a] guilty plea cannot be voluntary if it
is uninformed,' defendant's guilty plea was involuntary, and therefore the trial court's
error was prejudicial to defendant." Ostler. 2000 UT App 28, f26 (cite omitted).
The court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his
pleas where the record fails to support that McArthur understood the law for the separate
crimes in relation to the facts of this case. See State v. Vasilacopulos. 756 P.2d 92, 95
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (record failed to support that defendant understood full plea
ramifications), cert denied. 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988); Gibbons. 740 P.2d at 1312
(recognizing that a plea may not be voluntary unless the defendant received "real notice
of the true nature of the charge against him, the first, and most universally recognized,
requirement of due process"). McArthur respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
trial court's ruling on the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas.
2. The Trial Court Failed to Ascertain Whether a Factual Basis for the Two
Separate Guilty Pleas Existed. That Constitutes Plain Error Under Rule
11(e)(4)(B).
Finally, the guilty pleas are plainly and obviously defective where the record fails
to support a "factual basis" for each guilty plea. See. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(B).
According to Rule 11(e)(4)(B), "A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the
charged crime was actually committed by the defendant, or, if the defendant refuses or is
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otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to
establish a substantial risk of conviction " I d I his Coin t has n lied that in assessing
whether a factual basis exists for the plea, it will consider the record in its entirety.
In State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the state charged defendant with four counts of aggravated robbery. Defendant ultimately "pled guilty to three
counts of robbery pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162,
91 S. Ct. 160 (1970), under which he maintained his innocence while pleading guilty in
order to accept a favorable plea agreement." IcL at 669. During the plea colloquy in
open court, the trial court compared the charges - to which defendant entered the pleas to the first-degree-felony charges thai the slate originally ' ^u

"he record also

contained a written statement that defendant signed and initialed. The statement
identified the original charges and the reduced charges under the plea agreement, and it
specified that defendant's attorney had "gone over the facts" of the cases "very carefully"
with defendant, talked with key witnesses, ami obtained statements from the w itnesses in
the cases. IdL
Years after defendant entered the guilty pleas, he moved to withdraw them. He
argued, among other things, that the trial court "failed to inquire adequately into the
factual basis for Stilling's guilty plea. The argument stressed the inadequae\ of the pica
hearing under both procedural and constitutional requirements for a guilty plea and
requirements for an Alford plea in particular." Id. at 670. The trial court rejected the
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arguments, and defendant appealed. On review, this Court specified that plea
proceedings "must demonstrate that the defendant understood] the nature of each
element of the offense charged and the burden on the State to prove each element beyond
a reasonable doubt. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(d). The requirement that the record as a whole
demonstrate 'facts that would substantiate the prosecution of the charge at trial' has been
described as the need for a factual basis for the plea." IdL. at 671 (cite omitted).
This Court further stated, "the record must reveal either facts that would support
the prosecution of a defendant at trial or facts that would suggest a defendant faces a
substantial risk of conviction at trial, 'not merely facts establishing the defendant's
motivation for entering the plea.'" Stilling, 856 P.2d at 672 (citing omitted); see. also id.
at 674 ("In the more usual Rule 11 guilty plea situation, the factual basis requirement
insures that a defendant understands the strength of the State's case and admits to each
element of the charged crime").
In Stilling, this Court looked to the entire record to find a "factual basis, for prosecuting Stilling on the charges to which he pled." IcL at 676. The court found the pleas
to be valid. McArthur's case compels a different result.
The Plain and Obvious Error Here. Here, the record fails to support a factual
basis for the convictions. "While the record as a whole need not be conclusive or
uncontroverted on the question of guilt, 'there must be evidencefromwhich a court
could reasonably find that the defendant was guilty — a factual basis for the plea.'"
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Considering that analysis here, in proceedings below , the state acknow ledgedpi c >blems with its original charges against McArthur for two counts of aggravated assault.
.:>ee v

-

;... . ;.u: >iate was willing to have McArthur plead guilty to b vo

Significantly, during plea proceedings, the state failed to identify i Ihi'i» >' n
factual basis for the double charges under § 76-10-506. (See R. 92); Stilling, 856 P.2d
!
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.v, ,i:,i.:_ ..-. .he prosecutor to present a la^udi i\i>\^ lor the charges to
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marshaled evidence in this case fails to support a factual basis for 'the 'two charges.
To begin, the state charged McArthur with felony counts for allegedly assaulting
I .iiii'ii mini Allon "n ill* a kniK1 (counts 1 and 11), and with misdemeanor counts for simple
assiiiil* li,Tncsfk \ foiiiit r ti1 11 if prsni*, i.l , rh'hl "itn'^'iniu \ "Mi ;i (rliir H'ICIT,
and intoxication (counts ill through VI). (R. 3-6.) Die trial court dismissed Uic ninference charge and the state agreed to dismiss the charges for assault relating to Sherile,
iiIiniKH«!i( u o l a i a in Iniiil iii Monica, and intoxication. (R,'l"i I<>.) The remaining
charges related to McArthur's alleged use of II knitr in from oil Minn .iiid I auia.
. After the state filed the information, the trial court conducted a preliminary

hearing in the matter. Laura provided testimony relating to the knife. She stated that in
late October 2002, she and Afton became aware of a fight outside their home between
McArthur and Sherile. (R. 91:20.) When Laura and Afton went outside, Sherile ran
into the house to grab the phone and call 9-1-1. Sherile came outside again, and
McArthur struck her with his fist. He then disappeared. (R. 91:21-22.)
Laura and Afton went back into the house, locked the doors, and sat with the
lights on. (R. 91:22-23.) When McArthur returned to the house he asked to be let in.
He then dislodged or kicked in a window screen that was "not really attached" (R. 91:29)
and he unlatched the door. (R. 91:23) When he walked into the kitchen, he had an
aspirin container. He picked up a ten inch knife to open the container. (R. 91:24, 30.)
Laura saw McArthur struggle with "whatever he was trying to open, and we have
a very small living room. I was sitting in a chair over here, and Mom was at the front
door just kind of standing, and he came into the living room with the knife, and he went
to the door and he says, 'Now we're going to turn off the lights and pretend like we're
not home, and Mom, you're going to go lie down.5" (R. 91:24.) Laura indicated that
McArthur held his fist in the air with the knife. (R. 91:24, 30-31.) When counsel asked
Laura if the blade was pointed toward anyone, she testified that it was "kind of just
random around." (R. 91:25.) He never held the knife toward Laura. (R. 91:31.)
McArthur still held the knife as he walked to the door and turned off the porch
lights and the television. Laura testified initially that McArthur was not moving the
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I,, iiife

nisi locking the dooi

the lights with his hand and having the knife

pointed the knife toward Afton. Laura testified, "If I recall correctly, and I ' m not 100
percent sure about this, as he was going to the door it [the knife] was - I believe that it
v\ as, yes. ' Il mi ill mi in ml pn iilii'i. t, but I do be lieu. I hat it \uis,"" (R, 'M ,J L)
, \lh i" K 1< : Vrlhur turned off the porch lights he •<»» i " u h-n

< ^ (>l "lfc» )

McArthur stood up and sat down repeatedly, "just a little," not saying much of anything.
(R. 91:25.) Laura then walked to the front door, and she and Afton walked out to the
fit: i H ill J: < i ; J: [I I 9 1 33 ]

:

- •-•
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I ai ira presented evidence of one ronliiiiious in< ideml \\ i 11 I ill'llit" h u l l ' See State \,
Littlejohm 582 S.E.2d 3 0 1 , 30? (N.C. App. 2003) (stating that for separate counts of assault, the evidence "must establish 'a distinct interruption in the original assault followed
In ,i ,iuiihl iinitull

I .sidle v. i asey., lllll I I I App J h , l ] >i I. Ilh Jh 3» I'.Jd J!5

(recognizing that the facts for the charges of aggravated assai ill: ail :I attempted n in in: ier
were "separated b \ lime place and intervening circumstances"; the aggravated assault
occurred o • , *> dcieiidani f)i».iikv. the gun at the victim's face; the victim,, then left the car
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thereby constituting the attempted murder charged cert, granted, ^2 P.3d 24^ \\ ^ h
x'llHII |, Jlath K.i I al App, - .
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n, M u a i a c t n r

exhibiting a dangerous weapon occurs even when multiple officers are present). That is
insufficient to support two charges for exhibiting a dangerous weapon under § 76-10506. See supra, subpart C.I., pp. 25-30, herein.
The record also contained papers for the change of plea hearing (discussed supra.
subparts A., B., C.I.), and papers for sentencing. In the presentence investigation report,
McArthur denied using the knife as a weapon, threatening anyone with it, or pointing it
at anyone. (R. 86, page 3.) Afton made no mention of an offense involving a knife (id.,
page 8), and Laura admitted "a dispute about what actually took place regarding the
threat with the knife but she knows what she witnessed and the fear she felt." (Id.)
Last, the record contained papers relating to the motion to withdraw the guilty
pleas. There, McArthur moved to withdraw the pleas when he learned that Afton would
provide testimony "which was favorable to him and which would not support the state's
theory that he committed two counts of Aggravated Assault." (R. 56.) The state
opposed the motion (R. 62-64) and the parties argued the matter to the court. During argument, the prosecutor admitted that the state "anticipate^] some difficulty with [Afton]
and her cooperation with testimony in this case." (R. 87:4); Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at
442 and n.l (recognizing that defendant based his claim for withdrawal of the plea in
part on the fact that the state misrepresented the strength of its case). Notwithstanding
the state's admission, the trial court denied the motion to withdraw the pleas. (R. 67-69.)
As in Breckenridge, the record here fails to support a factual basis for the pleas:

38
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which w e might conclude that an arson ever occurred"); see. supra, subpart C.I., herein.
• The record in this case supports only one event,, the "same conduct" taking place
during one "time frame w (iliout intervening circumstances, (Not K. y)l ,K | (lie 'same
mi iiiiiiiiicl,""1" "same Mine Iraim"")), sec also Casey;.
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that the facts for the two charges were "separated by time, place and intervening circumstances"), The record fails to contain a factual basis for a second charge o f " threatening
ith or using [a] danger 01 is \ * sapon in a fight or quarrel' " in the presence of two or more
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Breckenridge, 688 T 2d a! 444; see also Utah R. Lrn:_. :\ 11(e)(4)(B) (pro\ iding that the
court may not accept a guilty plea unless it has found a factual basis for the plea)
ItSsiwung ui \!Mi ihlw i lliiuiin muni hi uti'snik'tll hi IIMIHHI lilt" IWH m haryes lim

exhibiting a dangerous weapon under § 76-10-506, the record fails to si ipport that
Mc Arthur understood the theory in the context of the separate charges and their relation
:< >bv i.tctsof this case. See supra, subpart (

»

^ institutes a due process

violation in the plea proceedings. See. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312-13; Breckenridge. 688
P.2d at 443. Stated a different way, even if the record in this case may be sufficient to
support the factual bases for two separate charges of "threatening with or using [a] dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel," the pleas were deficient; the two separate charges
were not explained to McArthur. (See R., generally.)
The trial court had the duty to ensure a factual basis for the guilty pleas and to
explain the nature of each separate charge to McArthur so that he could understand "the
elements of the crimes charged and the relationship of the law to the facts." Gibbons, 740
P.2d at 1312; Thurman, 911 P.2d at 375 (stating that the record failed to support that
defendant comprehended the nature/elements of the offense to which he pleaded guilty).
The trial court failed in that duty. It failed to guard against the possibility that McArthur
would plead to two separate crimes without sufficient understanding of the nature of
each crime in relation to the facts. That constitutes plain and obvious error. See
Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440.
Next, to the extent the assessment under Rule 11(e)(4)(B) requires this Court to
determine whether the record contained a factual basis for the original charges of
aggravated assault (two counts), this Court should find that the record was deficient for
the following reasons. First, as stated above, the state acknowledged problems with the
original charges here, and therefore, was willing to have McArthur plead guilty to lesser
charges. (R. 92:4-5; 87:4.) In that regard, the analysis here should focus on whether the
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Second, the marshaled evidence fails to support a risk of conviction under the
original charges. To explain, for aggravated assault, the state was required to prove an >
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• In this case, Laura testified at the preliminary hearing that
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the living room with a knife that he used to open a bottle. (R. 91:24, 30.) He held the
knife when lie turned out the lights and sat down

(R 91:25-26.)

According to Laura,

Mc
anything and did not verbally threaten Laura and Afton)), and lie aid iw>
in L a u r a ' s direction (R. 91:31).

he knife

, •.

W hile I aura testified that she believed the knife was p o i n a J toward Afton as
McArlhur vmit In II11111 1 n( (In lifhls, slin i in In I in I! hv sun
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support aggravated assault. It fails to establish an attempt, threat, or act committed by
McArthur to do bodily injury to Afton
kinin n ifli 1 in in 1 in dii.ilt Inn

It also fails to establish iluf McArthur used the

nil ' 1 lence and n A manner 1;K* V -

r

wduce serious bodily

injury toward Afton.5 See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(b).
Also, Laura testified that she said the word "no" to McArthur a "couple of times."
(R. 91:32.) Significantly, Laura did not remember why she said "no." (R. 91:32.) She
did not claim to say it in connection with an attempt by, threat from, or act committed by
McArthur to do bodily harm; she did not claim to say it in connection with any display of
immediate/unlawful force or violence; and she did not claim to say it even in connection
with McArthur's use of the knife. (See R. 91:32); also Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-102;
-103(l)(b); supra note 5, herein.
In sum, McArthur got a knife from the kitchen to open a bottle, he brought the
knife into the living room, he held his arm in the air with the knife when he announced
he would shut off the lights, and he continued to hold the knife while he turned the lights
off and sat down. McArthur held the knife "kind of just random around" (R. 91:25); he
was not moving it a whole lot, "just locking the door and turning off the lights with this
hand and having the knife in his hand" (R. 91:26), and he did not make verbal threats.
The evidence fails to support that McArthur attempted/threatened to do bodily

5 During a preliminary hearing, a trial judge found that the evidence rose "to the level of
a threat on both parties" and bound the defendant over on two counts of aggravated
assault. (R. 91:45.) That is insufficient. For aggravated assault, the threat must be
accompanied by a show of "immediate force or violence" and it must be a threat to do
bodily harm. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-102, -103(l)(b). For example, if McArthur had
threatened to take Laura's car and she said "no," that would not support aggravated
assault. Also, the evidence must establish that McArthur used the knife in a manner
likely to produce "serious bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103. The evidence
failed to establish those elements.
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support unlawful force or violence toward Afton and Laura; and J • *
the knife in a manner likeh

*

uuce serious injury. Utah Code \nn, §§ 76-5-;- ,

... ii^, . J :».. ,. -M ;u-rt a u.^,. •> ^a^is lor two counts of aggravated as<!.,l)1' l-'i" llln,11 in m
Ji I i iiiiiiiii I ni'th ii/vd Ihc Mllalt" lor lading
to recognize the weakness with the original charges); c)2;8 (the trial court

^ •

one" found a basis for the two lesser charges, but failed to identify' the basis); 87:4); Utah
• iiw-quHii.^ inecou1*!

K ("Viiii I
and to ens?

•

»* > i ^ ui.ii oasis for the pleas
f

•

-lenses I,

..-..:,Since the recu„ :._iw ian^ lo contain either a iaviuai oabis ior the crimes originally
charged or for the crimes to which McArthur entered the guilty pleas, the plea
proceedings failed lo eoiupl\ w ill!1! Rule I l(c ) That con? slil I ; pl-iin and obvious error.
See Breckenridge, 68K VP d 4 41)
The Prejudice. Since the judge did not make findings that McArthur understood
the nature and elements of the two charges and their relation to the facts of this case, and
tin n'cninl lails lo Mippoii (lie kit (iiiil bases loi Ihc guilty pleas, the pleas were unin- .
formed. I hey "cannot be truly voluntai y " Hieckenndae. fVKK P ,M n,1 I I I, Uslki. ,M)()0
UT App 28,112. Where the guilty pleas were involuntarily made, the convictions were
entered without due process of law, Breckenridge. 688 P.2d at 444; see supra, subpart
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it is uninformed/ defendant's guilty plea was involuntary, and therefore the trial court's
error was prejudicial to defendant." Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, ^[26 (cite omitted).
In this case, after McArthur entered the guilty pleas, the trial court sentenced him
to consecutive terms of incarceration for each separate offense. (R. 50-51.) The double
sentences for incarceration from the uninformed guilty pleas constitutes harm. See supra,
subpart C.I., herein; HaH, 83 Cal. App. 4th at 1096-97, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 289 (finding
the multiple sentences to be improper, where a single act of exhibiting a dangerous
weapon in the presence of officers occurred).
McArthur respectfully requests that this Court enter an order reversing the trial
court's ruling on the motion to withdraw guilty pleas. The convictions must be vacated
and the pleas must be set aside. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 444; Thurman, 911 P.2d at
374-75; Ostler. 2000 UT App 28, %H.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, McArthur requests that this Court reverse the trial
court's ruling on the motion to withdraw guilty pleas, and remand the case for further
proceedings in accordance with the law. McArthur is incarcerated; he is serving
consecutive sentences at the Utah State Prison for the misdemeanor offenses.
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ADDENDUM A

DISTRICT COURT - SALi _AK.i. L J U R T
,LT L A K E COUNTY, STATE OF U T A H
STATE ('
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'"AK,
Plaintiff

MINUTES
SENTENCE, J U D G M E N T , COMMITMENT
M.'

vs

Casp

RAYMOND DEAN MCARTHUR,
Defendant.
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail

Date:
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-n 21 Or ;-"S
J ^ N N I S raEDERICK
February 21, 2 003
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PRESENT
Clerk:
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Prosecutor: COOK, ALICIA H
Defendant
Defendant fr ?•— nrr^v ~3) : REMAI « I .ISA J
DEFENDANT IJM*'UKMAT1U:«
Date of birth: June 1 ] 959
Video
Tape Number:
1
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CHARGES
] THREAT/USF '•'.--• DANGEROUS WEAPON- v FIGHT (amended) - Class A
Misdemeanor
Plea: G u _ 2
DisposiL±un. . < LU,^UUJ Gui11y
2 THREAT/USE OF*DANGEROUS WEAPON IN FIGHT (amended) - Class A
Misdemeanor
P l e a : ":
E i spc >si 1 i n
dl 1: 0 2 0 03 3i :i i ] 1 .]
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of
WEAPON IN FIGHT a Class A Misdemeanor,
to a term of 1 year(s)
Based on the defendant's conviction of
WEAPON IN FIGHT a. Class A Misdemeanor,
to a term, of 1 year(s)
Commitment is to begi n immediately.

P^rro 1

THREAT/USE OF DANGEROUS"
the defendant is sentenced
THREAT/USE OF DANGEROUS
the defendant is sentenced

Case No: 021912108
Date:
Feb 21, 2003

SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
The Court grants credit for 117 days time served. Defendant is
ordered not to contact victim(s) in any way.
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Terms to run consecutive
Dated this _^P"day of

Pano
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ADDENDUM B

76-10-506. Threatening with or using dangerous weapon
in fight or quarrel.
Every person, except those persons described in Section 76-10-503, who, not
in necessary self defense in the presence of two or more persons, draws or
exhibits any dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening manner or
unlawfully uses the same in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 11. Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a
reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not
guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense
to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;

(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion
to withdraw the plea; and
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record
or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the
contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English
language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to
the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to
make a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by
the court.
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence
is not binding on the court.
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the
proposed disposition will be approved.
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and
then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.
(Amended effective May 1,1993; January 1, 1996; November 1,1997; November 1, 2001; November 1, 2002.)

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp. 2003)
§ 76-5-102. Assault
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily
injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to
another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury to another.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999)
§ 76-5-103. Aggravated assault
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 76-5102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses a
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1 -601 or other means or force likely to produce
death or serious bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 021912108

RAYMOND DEAN McARTHUR,

Judge J. DENNIS FREDERICK

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter having come before this Court for hearing on April 7th,
2003, in which Defendant was represented by counsel, Lisa Remal, and the State was
represented by counsel, Alicia H. Cook, the Court having fully considered the written
memoranda and oral arguments of counsel, this Court now enters its FINDINGS OF
FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and ORDER.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The defendant was charged by an information filed on October 29th, 2002,
with committing two counts of Aggravated Assault, one count of Assault,
one count of Commission of Domestic Violence in the Presence of a
Child, and one count of Interfering with a Peace Officer. On January 10th,
2003, the defendant pled guilty to two counts of Threatening With or

Using (a) Dangerous Weapon In (a) Fight or Quarrel under U.C.A. § 7610-506. The remaining charges were dismissed. The defendant, who was
represented by counsel, informed the court that he understood the rights he
was waiving by entering guilty pleas. The defendant moved to withdraw
his guilty pleas on March 21 st , 2003.
2.

The Court does not find that the defendant has demonstrated "good cause"
as required under U.C.A. § 77-13-6(2)(a). The defendant represents that
one of the witnesses to the Aggravated Assaults would give testimony
favorable to him, and that this establishes the "good cause" required for
the court to permit a withdrawal of his pleas. The defendant, however,
had access to this witness and her information before he entered his pleas.
Furthermore, this witness gave a statement in a pre-sentence report that
she was hesitant to discuss the incident because she was afraid the
defendant would be angry with her. The witness also stated that the
defendant can manipulate her, and that she feels threatened by him.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing facts, the Court concludes as a matter of law that the
defendant has not demonstrated "good cause" under U.C.A. § 77-13-6(2)(a).
ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas is DENIED.

^fe

DATED this MTday of April, 2003.
BY THE COURT:
7*^*0,

JudgfeJ

Approved as to form:

'•- -'V6
TfrPA'
-for^
Lisa Remal

FRED
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Defendant.

I, I'UAM.-Yn^v:! |Q . ^<-.4~vfWN . hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights:
Notification of Charges
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes:
Degree

Crime & Statutory
Provision

C\^%fr
O a r x y ^ i A - ^ t ^ n u~> fVt-jK^

^

Punishment
Min/$iaxynd/or
Minimum Mandatory
-tiut fibs H£\Q ^riChVixL

ir

B.
Class./r-

Sto
:

^'

D.
Pjfrq f W y i ' K f 1. Offcft fivrrM r f tf\£ tfh.^- pl^C t - W v rfivvii'.M'rv^ ^ t .irfr S

.

:iry. to Kg- cVSrs»vv<J

——
i /

1

I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am
pleading guilty (or no contest).
^ The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are:
fc^s M

iMavAjf-ilU

person

i/vv

fhf

'uJ'N?

v^Cf-ji\

r^c€\vjrt.i

Self1 dfftmcL.

Sfov^. Vr\7?iiM,| -fij^Kt- cr

n\ The _

<^^ge

I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crime
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest I am not contesting that I committed tfa
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest I do not dispute c
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons fc
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guil
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guill
(or no contest):

Waiver of Constitutional Rights
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rigl
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I pie
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights:
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understs

that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the
appointed lawyer's service to me.
I (have not})(have) waived my right to counsel, if Ihavewaived-my--right to counsel^
I4iave.4one-so4£ne^
, aiidToluntarily for the following reasons:-

IjHIiave waived myrigbHtfcoui)sel,I certify thatjUraVe read th& statement and that
I understand tne nature and"elements ofthe charges-aUHcrimes to which I am pleadinsrsuUtv
Jtfr no cutest). JKalso understand mv^rights in this case ^ndj}thefcases and the
consequ^nce^Ji my guilty (or n^gontest) plea(s).
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is L i£fl J . ifnv[ |
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, myrights,and the consequences of
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest).
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have
a jury trial, a) I would have therightto see and observe the witnesses who testified against
me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the
opportunity to cross-examine ail of the witnesses who testified against me.
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the
State would pay those costs.
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to
have a jury* trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I
chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself.
I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my
refusal to testify against me.
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead
guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the
charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty,"
and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving

each element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the
verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest).
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up ail
the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest), fknow that by-pleading guilty (or no-«coHtest)4e-a-crime thatcames amandatory penaltyyl-will be-subjeetinf-myseifUo-^mng^-mandatory penalty for that crime- I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or
both.
'
^Ju\
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of
a plea agreement.
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences beins
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be
inappropriate.

Plea bargain. My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of a plea
bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and
provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those
explained below:
>e* (pfoy. on£

Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge.
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering this plea of my ownfreewill and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises
except those contained in this statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes
because all of the statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of mv attorney.

<,,,,

I a m x i years of age. I have attended school through the L «/
grade. I can read
and understand the English language, if! do not understand English, an interpreter-has been—
-provided to me.-1 was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants
which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under
the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent mefromunderstanding what I am doing
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.

I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) within 30 days after I have been sentenced
and final judgment has been entered. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I
show good cause. I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any
reason.
Dated this 1^

day of

"fcuv-^u-,

, 2 CCK

4*v

y[ Ki^

DEFENDANT

Certificate of Defense Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for fux^-p^n^ ft />x l i t T h u r ' ' . the defendant
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief,
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are
accurate and true.

0k^J
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
Bar No. z~l'- h

Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
I U^-yn^a /) »^ c ,%ul< i s . defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant
and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the
offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage
a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the
Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the
Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction
of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance
of the plea(s) would serve the public interest.

iJU^A^j
PROSECUTING ATTG
Bar No. %8Z\

Order
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely,
knowingly, and voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.
Dated this

$ * >dav of
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 021912108
vs.
RAYMOND DEAN MCARTHUR,
Defendant.

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JUL - 7 2003
SALT LAKE COUNTY

Deputy Cterk

Change of Plea
Electronically Recorded on
January 10, 2003
BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
Third District Court Judge

For the Plaintiff:

Alicia H. Cook
SL Cnty Dist Dpty Atty
2001 S. State S3700
Salt Lake City, UT 84190
Telephone: (801)468-2617

For the Defendant:

Lisa J. Remal
LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South #300.
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)532-5444

Transcribed by:

Beverly Lowe RPR/CSR/CCT

1909 SOUTH WASHINGTON AVENUE
PROVO, UTAH 84606
TELEPHONE: (801)377-0027
Utah Lev.
.'.•i'U
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on January 10, 2003)

3

THE COURT:

State of Utah vs. Raymond Dean McArthur,

4

case No. CR-02108. Ms. Remal, you are appearing in his behalf

5

and Ms. Cook for the State.

6

MS. REMAL:

I am.

7

THE COURT: Are you Raymond Dean McArthur?

8

MR. MCARTHUR:

9

THE COURT: Ms. Remal is your lawyer; is that correct?

10

MR. MCARTHUR:

11

THE COURT:

Yes, sir, I am.

That's correct.

This matter is on the calendar incident

12

to a proposed resolution.

13

Ms. Remal?

14

What is it your are proposing here,

MS. REMAL: Your Honor, what we're proposing is that

15

Mr. McArthur will be pleading guilty to amended Count I and

16

amended Count II. Both will be amended to reflect threatening

17

with or using a dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel.

18

pursuant to 76-10-506. Upon entry of those pleas, I anticipate

19

that the State will move to dismiss the remaining counts

20

against him in this matter.

21

to recommend a reduction in bail for Mr. McArthur once those

22

pleas have been entered.

That's

The State is also willing to agree

23

THE COURT: The resulting charges are what?

24

MS. REMAL: Threatening with or using dangerous weapon

25

in fight or quarrel.
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THE COURT:

Which i s —

2

MS. REMAL:

If I can approach, I have a copy of that.

3

THE COURT:

What is that, a misdemeanor or something?

4

MS. REMAL:

It's a class A misdemeanor, yes.

5

THE COURT:

Do you have an amended Information, Ms.

6

Cook?

7

MS. COOK:

8

THE COURT:

9
10

(Inaudible).
To your knowledge, then, Ms. Remal, after

pleas to the class A's, do you believe that the rest of the
Information is to be dismissed?

11

MS. REMAL:

Yes.

12

THE COURT:

And to your knowledge that constitutes the

13
14

entirety of the proposed resolution?
MS. REMAL:

Except that I understand Ms. Cook will

15

join me in recommending to the Court that Mr. McArthur's bail

16

be reduced to $10,000.

17

made its way to your file.

18

THE COURT:

I did file a formal motion.

It is here.

I hope it

Now insofar as the proposed

19

resolution is concerned, Ms. Remal, have you discussed it with

20

Mr. McArthur?

21

MS. REMAL:

I have.

22

THE COURT:

And you've gone over the statement of the

23

defendant with him?

24

MS. REMAL:

I have.

25

THE COURT:

Are you persuaded he understands the
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effect and meaning of what he's about to do here?

2

MS. REMAL: Yes.

3

THE COURT:

4
5

Does that fairly state the proposed

resolution, Ms. Cook, and if it does, will you state why?
MS. COOK:

It does (inaudible) your Honor.

I would

6

like to inform the Court that Count IV of the Information was

7

not bound over (inaudible).

8

THE COURT: The class B, one of the class B's?

9

(Ms. Cook stood over at end of table away from

10

microphone,

11

word)

12

MS. COOK:

13

arrest is not (inaudible).

14

ago, and the evidence presented by my witnesses (inaudible)

15

terribly strong in regards to (inaudible) amended Information

16

(inaudible).

17
18
19
20
21
22
23

which made it impossible to get every

Interfering a peace officer making an

THE COURT:

The prelim on this case a few weeks

Have you discussed this with the victim?

Are victims involved?
MS. COOK:

The victims have been informed and

(inaudible).
MS. REMAL: The victims are relatives of
Mr. McArthur's, your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, yeah, I see a domestic violence type

24

of a case (inaudible).

The question, though, it occurs to me

25

that it was not until the preliminary hearing, you realized
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that that didn't have a third degree.

2

MS. COOK:

3

THE COURT: Well, of course.

4

MS. COOK:

5

THE COURT:

6
7
8
9

Your Honor (inaudible).

Okay (inaudible).
Exercising acute critical analysis

yourself, you came to the conclusion that you didn't have it?
MS. COOK:

I think (inaudible) trial after hearing the

witness testify.
THE COURT: Well, was it the first time it occurred to

10

you, at the preliminary?

11

MS. COOK: Yes.

12

THE COURT:

13

You hadn't discussed this matter with your

witnesses previously?

14

MS. COOK:

15

THE COURT: All right. You say that the victims are

16

No (inaudible).

relieved to have this matter resolved.

17

MS. COOK:

18

THE COURT: Mr. McArthur, do you understand what's

19

They're satisfied (inaudible).

being proposed here?

20

MR. MCARTHUR:

21

THE COURT: Well, you've talked to your lawyer about

22

I'm quite sure (inaudible).

it, haven't you?

23

MR. MCARTHUR: Yes.

24

THE COURT: You've gone over that statement with your

25

lawyer, haven't you?
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MR. MCARTHUR:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR- MCARTHUR:

4 J

THE COURT:

5

MR. MCARTHUR:

6 I

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

Do you understand that statement?
Yes, sir.

Do you have any questions at all about it?
No, sir.

Have any threats or promises been made to

7

you or against you to get you to enter into these plea

8

agreements other than what has been stated in open court?

9

MR. MCARTHUR:

No, sir.

10

THE COURT: You're doing this freely and voluntarily?

11

MR. MCARTHUR:

12

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

You understand, Mr. McArthur, by pleading

13

guilty you're waiving certain constitutional rights that you

14

otherwise have.

15

MR. MCARTHUR:

16

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

Including the right to by tried by a jury

17

of eight people, the right to require the State to prove their

18

case against you beyond a reasonable doubt to the unanimous

19

satisfaction of a jury of eight people, the right to confront

20

and cross examine witnesses produced by the State against you,

21

the right to compel the attendance of witnesses in your own

22

behalf at no cost to you, the right to take the stand and

23

testify in your own behalf, if you choose, or remain silent

24

during the trial, if you choose, and the right to appeal in the

25

event a jury finds you guilty of the charges at a trial, as
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well as the right to be presumed innocent until you're found

2

guilty if you are, all of which rights, as well as the others

3

contained on that statement that we may not have discussed

4

you're waiving by the entry of a guilty plea.

5

understand that?

Do you

6

MR. MCARTHUR:

Yes, sir, I do.

7

THE COURT: And knowing those waivers, do you want to

8

proceed with this plea arrangement that the lawyers now have

9

decided upon?

10

MR. MCARTHUR:

11

THE COURT: And you're doing this freely and

12

Yes, sir.

voluntarily?

13

MR. MCARTHUR:

14

THE COURT: Are you prepared to sign that statement at

15

Yes, sir.

this time?

16

MR. MCARTHUR:

17

THE COURT: You may do so.

18

(Defendant signs statement)

19

MS. REMAL: Your Honor, if I may approach, Mr.

20
21

Yes, sir.

McArthur has now signed the statement (inaudible) as well.
THE COURT: Very well, thank you.

Indeed both Counsel

22

and defendant have signed the statement. Mr. McArthur, you

23

understand by having signed this statement you are admitted is

24

true and correct the following facts and elements involved in

25

two separate counts of threatening with or using a dangerous
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weapon in a fight or a quarrel, specifically that on or about

2

the 26th of October of last year through the 27th of October of

3

last year, at the location of 309 North, 1000 West in Salt Lake

4

County, you, according to the offense, did not in self defense

5

draw or exhibit a dangerous weapon in an angry or threatening

6

manner or unlawfully used the same in a fight or quarrel.

7

Those facts and elements are true and correct, are they not,

8

sir?

9
10

MR. MCARTHUR:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT: This same conduct, which is constituted as

11

a threat of a dangerous —

use of a dangerous weapon in a fight

12

occurred at the same location, 309 North, 1000 West during the

13

same timeframe, the 26th/27th October on two different

14

occasions.

15

MS. REMAL:

It was during one incident, your Honor.

16

THE COURT: Well, there's two different charges.

17

MS. REMAL: Right.

18

MR. MCARTHUR: Yes.

19

THE COURT:

So someone has been able to find that

20

there were two separate incidences going on here, even though

21

it may have been part of the same larger fight, right?

22

prepared to plead to two separate charges—

23

MR. MCARTHUR:

24

THE COURT:

25

a dangerous weapon.

You're

Yes, there—

—involving the use of threatening use of
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MR. MCARTHUR:

2

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Those facts and elements as they relate to

3

the use of dangerous weapons, specifically a knife, did occur

4

during the time frame as indicated at the location stated; is

5

that right, sir?

6

MR. MCARTHUR:

7

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

Do you understand that those facts and

8

elements constitute two separate class A misdemeanor crimes for

9

which you could be sentenced by this Court for a period of up

10

to one year in the Adult Detention Center and fined a sum of

11

$2500 plus a surcharge.

12

MR. MCARTHUR:

13

THE COURT:

That's clear to you; is it not?
Yes, sir.

And knowing the potential penalty of one

14

year and/or a $2500 fine on each of the two, do you want to

15

proceed with this arrangement these lawyers have worked out?

16

MR. MCARTHUR:

17

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

You understand furthermore that if I

18

determine to commit you to the jail, those terms in jail could

19

well be consecutive as opposed to concurrent?

20

MR. MCARTHUR:

21

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

I will therefore accept your statement if

22

it is executed freely and voluntarily, Mr. McArthur, which I

23

assume it is?

24

MR. MCARTHUR:

25

THE COURT:

Yes, sir (inaudible).

Very well.

Due to the charges as set

I
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1

forth in Count I of the Information has now been amended by

2

interlineation to threat —

3

weapon during a quarrel, a class A misdemeanor.

4

what is you plea?

5

MR. MCARTHUR:

6

THE COURT:

threatening use of a dangerous

Guilty.

Count II, threatening use of a dangerous

7

weapon during a quarrel, a class A misdemeanor.

8

what is you plea?

9
10

To Count I

MR. MCARTHUR:
THE COURT:

To Count II

Guilty.

I will accept your guilty pleas and

11

dismiss the balance of this information.

12

justice you have the right now to be sentenced in no less than

13

two nor more than 45 days from today's date.

14

your matter for sentencing.

15

COURT CLERK:

16

THE COURT:

In the interest of

I'll schedule

February 21st.
The 21st of February, which is Friday

17

morning at 8:30.

In addition, you have the right for good

18

cause shown in no more than 30 days from the date of sentencing

19

to move to set aside the guilty pleas entered here.

20

Now Counsel, there is a motion to reduce bail, and

21

you're prepared, I'm advised, Ms. Cook to concur with or at

22

least not object to that motion?

23

MS. COOK:

24

THE COURT:

25

That's correct.
What kind of threat does this man pose to

the victims involved?
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MS„ COOK:

Well, it was my understanding that he

2

(inaudible) he would stay entirely away from them,

3

(inaudible).

4

MS. REMAL:

I'm

Your Honor, I can respond to that, I

5

think.

6

were reduced the Court certainly would order him to stay away

7

from the individuals involved in this case, which is his

8

mother, his sister and his daughter.

9

As I stated in the motion, we expect that if his bail

He has another relative, a niece, that provided her

10

name and address with whom he can reside.

11

employment available to him, but probably more important than

12

anything is his intention to immediately seek treatment for

13

alcohol abuse. At the time of this event, it's clear that Mr.

14

McArthur had been consuming alcohol, and we understand that

15

that has created a lot of problems for him in his life and

16

certainly contributed greatly to his inability to control his

17

behavior on this night.

18

that if his family were consulted, they would probably indicate

19

that use of alcohol makes a huge difference in his behavior.

20

He still has

I don't know for sure, but I expect

THE COURT: Well, since the State doesn't seem to be

21

particularly concerned about the reduction and is willing to

22

agree to it, I have no basis upon which to challenge the wisdom

23

of the stipulation of reduced bail.

24

request to reduce the bail.

25

I will therefore grant the

Now Mr. McArthur, as far as you and I are concerned,
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if you happen to make bail, you will absolutely have no contact

2

whatever with any of the victims involved in this matter.

3

that clear to you?

Is

4

MR. MCARTHUR:

Yes, sir,

5

THE COURT: And you will absolutely not engage in the

6

use of any alcohol or illicit substances during this pre-

7

sentence period; do you understand?

8

MR. MCARTHUR:

Yes, your Honor.

9

THE COURT: All right.

You follow those terms and

10

keep in touch with your lawyer, but you be back here for

11

sentencing on the date of the 21st of February at 8:30 in the

12

event you're going to make bail.

13

referral slip here that has the address of Adult Probation and

14

Parole on it.

15

office of the AP&P, give them the information they need to do

16

the pre-sentence report.

If you make bail you must go immediately to the

Is that clear?

17

MR. ARTHUR:

18

THE COURT: All right.

19
20

We'll provide you with a

Yes, your Honor.
Thank you.

That will be the

order.
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, if I may approach, I have

21

prepared a not very nice looking, but I think a document that

22

would reflect (inaudible) order (inaudible).

23

THE COURT: That's fine (inaudible).

24

MS. REMAL:

25

Your Honor, Ms. Cook is suggesting that we

make sure that the trial date, which was set for the 21st and

-1322nd is stricken.

I'm assuming—

THE COURT: Well, of course,
(Hearing concluded)
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